The Macro Trading Floor transcript – 6 December 2024

Alf (00:00.834)

Hi everybody, welcome back to The Macro Trading Floor. Alf speaking, back from a few weeks off, with my good friend, Brent. How are you doing, mate?

Brent (00:08.668)

I am good. So you were in the middle of nowhere in Japan.

Alf (00:12.056)

Konnichiwa. I can speak three more words of Japanese, but that’s enough. Yeah, that was very nice. At some point we didn’t see Western tourists for a week, which was a bit impressive, but nice and refreshing. Back to a situation where now that we have to trade macro with a ping notification on Twitter based on Trump tweets. You know, that’s…

Brent (00:37.422)

Yeah, we’re back to that old thing. And actually, while you were away, there was a couple of big market moving ones, specifically the one about Canada and Mexico. So it is definitely getting interesting again from that point of view.

And I remember, I think I said in actually one of my am/FXs that you could probably hire like a sub PM if you’re a portfolio manager and just get that person to trade headlines because there’s going to be so many headlines like in 17, 18 where, you know, the deal’s on, the deal’s off, the tariffs are coming, the tariffs are not coming. And yeah, we’re back there, back to 2017.

Alf (01:10.99)

Unfortunately, well, let’s try to clean out a bit of the noise and see if we can extract some signal from predicting Trump. Good luck to us and to any other macro investor out there for next year. So my working thesis until proven otherwise by tweets is that Trump 2.0 is the last Trump. mean, this is his last presidency and… He has a four year term and I think that nobody remembers the first three to six months of a four year presidency, I think.

So if I were him, knowing this and knowing that there are a couple of economies that are already a bit struggling, probably you can get the best out of it by being super aggressive early on towards these countries. And it seems that’s what Trump is trying to do actually, Brent, with like Canada or Europe, for example, and try to get something out of it by being very aggressive. That’s my working thesis, but what do you think of it?

Brent (02:06.222)

So I agree with that. I think in 2017, they did a bunch of random stuff like tried to repeal Obamacare and things that didn’t move the needle. And I think they view that as a mistake. And so now they’re going to do the stuff that they know they can do. So tariffs is the one that’s probably the easiest to do.

And like you said, I think they basically view it as, we have two years with the majority. I mean, they barely have a majority in the House. So they’re not going to screw around. And the thing though is that obviously that’s kind of like the base case, that’s a little bit priced in, but I feel like it’s not as priced in as it would be if say, say we actually knew these tariffs were coming, whatever they’re going to be, you know, things would be a lot different, especially the dollar and maybe other markets.

So there’s only so much you can price in based on speculation and tweets, especially because in 2016 and 2017, a lot got priced in and then everyone got destroyed because essentially in January 2017, the process of negotiations started with China. So there were no tariffs, and so for example, Dollar China was the big trade.

And on January 3rd, 2017, so even before inauguration, the PBOC engineered a funding squeeze and there was sort of some conciliatory kind of vibes, and dollar China absolutely collapsed. And the dollar went down almost all of 2017. So I think it’s interesting because it’s so binary, like either the tariffs happen and the dollar goes up and all whatever you want to do based on tariffs… or they don’t, and there’s some kind of conciliatory thing or like it just is taking longer.

And then all these positions that are preparing for day one tariffs are going to need to unwind. So I don’t think there’s really a world where things are just sitting here like on January 20th. It’s either going to be tariffs or no tariffs and that’s pretty binary.

Alf (04:09.728)

Make vol great again, basically.

Brent (04:11.726)

Yeah, well actually speaking of that, if you look at FX vol versus like VIX there’s actually a huge spread because the trade on tariffs is definitely buy dollars but no one really knows what to do in equities except just buy them every day. So there’s actually a pretty pretty decent premium of FX vol over equity vol. But then actually still FX vol is pretty low. If you think that there’s going to be big tariffs on day one, things are gonna move a lot.

Alf (04:44.428)

Yeah, so I was looking at FX vol across a couple of countries. If the working hypothesis is that Trump is going to get harsher on countries that are already perhaps struggling because from a negotiation perspective, that’s where you get the most, right? You go and hammer people that are already in trouble and try to do it harsh from the get go.

You know, like if you look at stuff like Canadian dollar downside, yes it has gone up a bit after that specific tweet you’re referring to, but it is nothing overly expanded. So that’s something that is interesting. But now I want to reflect with you for a second on what actually happens to the US economy, if Trump comes in out of the gate sprinting and slashing tariffs left, right and center.

I mean, there is one line of thought that says look, mean, import of goods and commodities and stuff like that from the US doesn’t really account for much of economic momentum, really. So you’re not going to see a lot happening. Yes, maybe some weakness in specific sectors, but the US consumer is very strong and, you know, they’re not going to matter that much. They’re not going to care that much about tariffs.

Second line of thought is, well, wait a second, because it’s not that easy. I mean, the labor market isn’t very strong, so it doesn’t take too much to topple over these NFPs to more scary numbers, especially if Musk and Vivek come in and decide to fire half the employees or whatever they’re trying to do with this government reform. So there are two lines of thought there. Is there one line of thought that actually you want to marry more?

Brent (06:24.44)

Well, there’s a couple of interesting things because I would think right now you’re probably seeing a lot of front loading of ordering and anything that basically people think might have a tariff. People are probably going nuts buying it right now. So the next few months could see pretty decent economic data or the economic data that’s looking at November, December, January is going to look probably pretty decent in the US.

But then I think it really comes down to the size of the tariffs. Because there is this attitude of like, we got all those tariffs on China in 2017 or sorry in 2018 and you know, inflation didn’t go up, supply chains were fine, the world didn’t end. But that’s completely different from like 25 % tariff on Canada, which is like, you know, a different type of trading partner, a bigger tariff, different type of trading partner.

And then so the question becomes like how big are the tariffs? Because say Trump’s talking about a 60 % tariff. It sounds like from what Elon Musk and others are saying, like, and Scott Bessent, that they wouldn’t just say like, okay, we’re doing a 60 % tariff today. It would be more like, we’re gonna put a 10 % and we’re gonna go up 10 % every four months, up to 60 % until you stop sending fentanyl to the U.S. or whatever. Some kind of whatever negotiation they want to do.

And so I don’t really think it’s going to be like the massive thing on day one. I think there’ll probably be smaller ones that they plan to increase. And so I don’t think the economic impact initially will be massive because I think Bessent will be in that mode of like, you can’t just put 60 % across the board tariff on day one and expect things to actually work.

So that would be my view is that they start a little bit smaller with the sort of like a scaling in strategy. And the attempt, I guess, is to extract as much in terms of like, onshoring, reshoring, US isolationism, US exceptionalism, like basically extract as much of that as you can without destroying the economy with a shock, like with a one-time shock.

Alf (08:46.574)

Sounds reasonable with the only problem that Bessent can say whatever he wants, but the only thing he can actually do is decide whether to issue T-bills or to issue long bonds. That’s one of the few things he can actually do. Quite important, by the way, for next year. The US has to refinance a small amount of $7 trillion of maturing debt. And I don’t want to scare anybody or sound like a fear monger guy because the US issues the reserve currency of the world. They will easily refinance all the 7 trillion. It’s no problem.

Question actually is at what part of the curve and what price and is there a strategy behind it? So that’s actually something Bessent can influence, but I’m not sure he can really influence the Trump tariff strategy. He can advise, but God knows whether Trump takes anything under advisement these days.

Brent (09:40.844)

Well, and I think the general view is that he would have already acquiesced to whatever Trump wants before getting the job or he wouldn’t have got the job.

Alf (09:46.093)

Yeah. That’s a fair point.

Brent (9:48.462)

That actually brings up, I don’t know what you think about this, but the whole deficit reduction thing and the DOGE, like the Vivek and Musk thing and all that, to me, I’m extremely skeptical of all that. Like they’re talking about cutting one or two trillion out of a discretionary budget that’s 1.7. So what you’re going to cut 65 to 110 % of the entire discretionary budget? I mean, it makes no sense.

But then at the same time, the, the sort of like desire to do radical stuff obviously is indicated by all the nominations. So like, you can’t completely just say, they’re not going to do anything. Like they’re definitely going to do something. And that actually could end up being fiscal drag, oddly enough. So like if you got tax cuts and some kind of like, I don’t know, we were cutting all these government departments and doing this and that, it could actually end up being fiscal drag.

I’m skeptical, like I said, like if they cut 20,000 jobs out of 3 million, I’d be surprised. Because the problem is, it’s like bringing McKinsey into General Motors or whatever. They can recommend, Musk and Vivek can recommend whatever they want, but then you got a super thin majority in the House and you got to pass all this stuff and none of it’s going to pass, I don’t think. But I don’t know, what do you think about the whole deficit reduction thing?

Alf (11:07.746)

Well, it’s a bit of mathematics. I mean, first of all, a statistic that is going to surprise a few people. The US is running roughly a six and a half to seven percent deficit pace. Half of that is interest payment on debt. Now, something to stress out because there’s a very big difference between the US injecting money into the economy by cutting taxes and stuff like that, and the US paying a four percent rate coupon or on a bond or a T bill.

I mean, ask yourself, what is more stimulative? Giving money to PIMCO to own treasuries or to hedge funds that own T bills as collateral? How is that going to be stimulative for the real economy? That’s actually half of the deficit, guys. I mean, just for you to know. And the remaining half is actually primary deficit, which is basically the US taxing less than what it spends into the real economy. That is just an observation there.

Now, if you want to reduce the 7 % deficit, you can go and try to cut your interest rate spending. So you can, well, if you are Trump or Bessent, you can’t really do that because you do not control the level of interest rates. There are two guys that do control it. The first is called Mr. Powell and he controls the front end of the rates market. And then the second one is called Mr. Market and he controls the back end.

So look, I mean, at the minimum, I would say that Trump, maybe Bessent as well, would really love to have rates 100 basis point lower next year because if you do 7 trillion at 100 basis point lower of refinancing, then it definitely helps with the deficit. It does, you know. But when you do the numbers, you’re cutting off like 0.7 to 0.8 % of GDP, Brent. That’s all. Like instead of 6.5%, you’re going to have 5.8 % GDP deficit. I mean, that’s…

So what about the rest? As you said, it’s discretionary spending, it’s not a lot. And you can’t expect these guys to cut half of it. I don’t see the mathematics to get to 3 % GDP even in five years from now, frankly.

Brent (13:14.474)

Yeah, unless you start messing with Social Security and stuff like that. I mean, it’s the same thing with the mass deportations is, you know, these are things that people have wanted to do for a long time. I mean, the GAO exists to cut government waste, but like, it’s just very difficult to actually do it in real life. And I guess the mass deportation thing is the same. It’s, you know, Trump had, had suggested that in 2016 as well.

And actually deportations were lower in his period, in his term than they were in Obama’s term. And I think it’s simply because it’s just the logistics of finding illegal immigrants and moving them out of the United States. That’s not an easy lift.

Alf (13:53.87)

No, indeed. So, I mean, on the deficit side, I think it’s relatively clear. What actually is also interesting as a topic since I came back is that there is one strong line of thought that the Federal Reserve is starting to acknowledge that this long run dot they have, so basically their view of neutral rate, might actually be a bit too pessimistic.

So the long run dot is still, I think, below 3 % as we speak. The view of the Fed, even when rates were at zero, by the way, has been that long term neutral was 2.5 % roughly, and they’ve only bumped it up to like 2.875. So a tiny bit, after the pandemic. But I think if you start to listen to Fed speak a little bit more, you see more and more evidence that the Fed might believe that neutral rates are actually higher.

So the reason why nobody knows what neutral rates are, just to make sure. But the reason why I’m saying this is that at some point the Federal Reserve might think that they don’t need to cut that much at the end of the day. And because ultimately you don’t want to accommodate policy, you want to have neutral policy. If the new neutral rate is well above 3%, then you don’t need to cut all that much. So this is something that is, I think might happen.

I have a theory that can help the Fed, as in to justify this new higher neutral rate and I can elaborate a bit on it. But for the bond markets, I think it will matter because they’re already pricing a higher neutral than the Fed believes or the Fed says they believe, but the Fed endorsing a higher neutral is a very different ballgame. At some point you might end up fully pricing 90-95 with, we have already done the cuts and we don’t need any more cuts. So this is something that people should be aware of.

What that’s going to do is actually going to increase bond yields, so it’s going to tighten financial conditions a bit more. And if that happens while Trump imposes tariffs, then I think it’s an interesting setup, but it’s a lot of ifs, to be frank.

Brent (15:58.87)

Yeah, I think it’s interesting because I would say throughout the life of this podcast, mostly when pricing kind of got to the point where you weren’t sure if there was going to be cuts, it kind of was always the time to bet on more cuts. But now, I agree with you. Like you still have Atlanta Fed GDPnow is making new highs, and CPI you can tell from the Fed commentary this week that some of the Fed governors are getting a little bit nervous that it’s sticky. And so like CPI is kind of basing.

And there could be a world where, you know, we’re doing this on Thursday, payrolls comes out tomorrow, CPI next week. There could be a world where, you know, either they cut in December or they don’t cut in December and then they’re on hold for a while. And then you kind of get through and all of sudden you’re like, okay, well, that’s it. Maybe that’s it for a while.

Because the economy has just been so resilient and like we keep waiting for things to turn over and you know, little aspects turn over here and there like under the hood, the labor market looks like it’s turning over but then it never really does. And yeah, you could easily have a scenario where you think neutral is higher, GDP is still printing at three and a half, CPI is ticking a little bit higher, and all of a sudden, instead of, I don’t know, what is it, three or four cuts? I didn’t look today. But instead of three or four in 2025, maybe you end up with one.

I wouldn’t say that’s my base case, but like the fun thing about 2025 is that honestly, like you can extrapolate all you want from 2024, but it’s just a completely, there’s going to be a regime shift on January 20th. And we don’t really know what that’s going to look like. And unfortunately for Trump, he’s coming in at a very bad starting point. Like as a president, coming in with everything at the highs is a lot more difficult for your four-year outcome.

Alf (18:01.026)

Yeah. So the small theory I have is that if you look at the pattern for private sector leverage and public sector leverage, the US is now applying a very different playbook than before the pandemic. I mean, if you looked at the period between 2015 and 2019, public sector, so the government, did some small deficits, like 2 % of GDP, primary, a little bit each year, not much. And the private sector in the US didn’t really deleverage either.

So basically it was like this mediocre macro performance that we saw. It was okay, nothing special. But after the pandemic, now it’s been four years in a row, where the private sector was allowed to deleverage because the public sector is printing money for them like there is no tomorrow. So you are getting more income and… you know, your asset side of your balance sheet goes up because your nominal wages are going up, your assets are going up, stonks to the moon, Bitcoin, whatever you own, everything is going up. Your wages are going up.

And on the liability side, you can afford to slowly de-leverage even passively. Let’s say as a percentage of your income, you’re actually slowly de-leveraging. And actually, I mean, Brent, if there are, if you think about it, if there are less mortgages to refinance, less corporate loans to refinance, at least in percentage of your income, of your earnings, then one can make an argument for which rates can be a little bit higher. The economy can survive those higher rates if there is less private sector leverage to refinance.

In the US specifically, because the bond vigilantes are not going to have an easy life, mean, the US is the reserve currency issuer of the world. If the UK tries to do something like that, as we all know, then the outcome can be different because the vigilantes kick in fast. But the US actually, it’s a quite interesting position. So it might be the Fed marries this idea that because of a gentle deleveraging of the private sector, nominal rates can actually be a little bit higher, maybe.

Brent (20:03.544)

Right. And then essentially you could argue that the post-GFC period from 2010 to 2019 was a historical anomaly. Like if you look at the last 75 years or whatever, the same way that World War II was an anomaly of financial repression and artificially low yields. And now maybe you can argue that we’re just going back to like a more normal functioning economy because the deleveraging is complete. Or the deleveraging has happened and the governments have levered up and so that’s like a less risky type of leverage.

Alf (20:40.942)

Yeah, and then you see places instead where the private sector is highly leveraged and the government is still refusing to do anything to help. I mean, Canada is a good example from a government perspective, a very, very fiscal constrained type of country. There are many more out there, I mean, Australia, New Zealand, et cetera, where the level of private sector leverage is quite high. Canada, New Zealand, for example, and you’re not getting any help from the government at all.

And I think you’re going to see a lot more diversity between countries and how they handle their economic cycle because not in any place it works the same way.

Brent (21:16.972)

Yeah, actually Canada is really interesting because there’s a lot of things lining up that are all bad right now or bad for the currency and potentially bad for the economy. So one thing is that Trump seems to have his focus on Canada, which was a big surprise because people were much more worried about China and Europe and Asia than they were about Canada. And for some reason, he seems to be trolling Canada a lot.

And you know, there’s an idea that he puts tariffs on Canadian crude or on Canadian, like, you know, on all Canadian exports, but specifically on Canadian crude. And that makes the US automatically more competitive, which sort of accomplishes two things at once. Cause you can bully one of your trading partners into doing whatever you need them to do on fentanyl or immigration or whatever… and then at the same time, you make their crude less competitive, which helps us crude producers.

So you have the Trump thing. You also have a change in immigration policy. Immigration has been massive in Canada. And yet GDP per capita has been pretty horrible in Canada. So really the only reason Canada GDP has been okay is because you’ve had so many more people. And so if you slow down the immigration, then that creates another vulnerability, I think.

And then there’s always this consumer debt stuff which you’ve written about, which is like, I would view that as kindling for a potential fire and then the fire really kicks in if the job market turns south because everyone’s gonna make their mortgage payment. If they have a job, they’ll figure out a way, but when they lose their job, then they can’t.

So some pockets of Canadian real estate too have been pretty weak, especially Toronto condo market. So I feel like normally above 140, I don’t like dollar Canada because just historically it doesn’t go doesn’t stay above 140 that much. But I have a feeling next year we might actually just go way higher, like way stronger dollar versus Canada because also real rates are still very high in Canada like inflation is pretty low and and they so they can cut more. There’s just feels to me like a lot of things all lining up that could potentially be CAD negative in 2025.

And actually you said at the top of the show that vol is pretty low. I don’t know if this will interest people, so I’ll keep it short… So dollar Canada is around 140 right now and an option that says dollar Canada is going to be above 145 in three months, which is easily possible because if they do, if Trump announces tariffs, it’ll be there. And also, I mean, it’s gone up 500 points in the last eight weeks. So, 500 points is not that crazy. And that option costs like 13%. So whatever that is that set pays seven to one.

So that just gives you an idea of Canadian dollar volatility is still pretty low in the market. And I don’t know, I think people should be hedging for the potential of like a real blowout in Q1 in Canada.

Alf (24:23.598)

Yeah, I really like this idea of Canadian downside in terms of effects. In general, it’s all about odds, right? I mean, when you’re paying 13%, it’s 7 to 1. If you can foresee a world where that 7 to 1 shouldn’t really be priced 7 to 1, it’s always a good bet. Ex ante, the odds are skewed a little bit your way. I mean, subjectively, of course, there is no way to measure this thing objectively. But if you can foresee a world where other participants start to agree with your view of the world, that’s enough to make money.

This idea that you always have to be terminally right, it’s something that is really annoying. Sometimes you don’t have to be terminally right. Maybe Trump doesn’t put tariffs on Canadian crude. Maybe he doesn’t. But the fact that it threatens it and the fact that maybe coincides with some Canadian domestic weakness, that will be enough to push the trade your way. You don’t have to be right terminally.

Do you know what else I’ve heard from my client base? Europe is dying, Brent. But this time for real, it’s really bad, it’s a patient in his coma and that’s it. Now, I mean, I’m joking because we always like to look at odds and what’s priced in and does it make sense? And actually you can understand all the rational arguments by which they’re pointing to the situation. France, last but not least, is one of the many, problems that Europe has now.

But on the other hand, just let me tell you something on pricing. I have this small model that derives probabilities from the option market. So I looked at the Euribor futures, which are basically, let’s say, a proxy for the ECB deposit rate. Please, if you’re a rates trader, yes, the basis between the ECB depot and Euribor, I know, I know. Just allow me. So if you look at this thing, over the last eight weeks, Brent, there has been a huuuuuge bid for stuff that sees ECB rates below 1 % in a year from now.

Brent (26:36.29)

Yeah, the terminal rate stuff for the ECB is wild. Like the difference in the terminal rates is getting really interesting across all the countries.

Alf (26:41.87)

I mean, you know, the modal outcome is like, you know, the ECB is going to cut to 1.75, you know, something like that. But then really this bid for the tail, like people are very happy to go and bid and pay 20%, 25% upfront to own the fact that the ECB is going to cut to 1 % or below. I 1 % guys, we are like three… I mean, it’s a lot of cuts coming in a year.

And it’s a little bit of the sentiment, I think, that Europe is dying, that like in Switzerland, we’re back at talking about negative rates, also interesting. The idea is that in Europe, we’re gonna be back at 1 % very, very, very fast and there is chance we get there. I don’t know really.

Brent (27:24.768)

Yeah. So this Europe thing raises an interesting question from a trading point of view, because I feel like the thesis is pretty solid. The rate differentials are widening every single day. You got some political bullshit, which I don’t really care about, but the economic stuff definitely lines up as like, it’s kind of a classic interest rate differential play and it’s trending and you have some potential catalysts. You have potentially the Fed on hold and to me, the story makes sense.

And then the other side of it is trying to figure out positioning. Because it’s like the narrative is very consensus, but the question is whether the positioning is huge. And then on top of that, you also have seasonality, which is usually bullish Euro, but not always. So it’s one of those things where you really have to decide what weight you want to put on the variables. Cause if you, if you put a lot of weight on positioning and seasonality, then there’s just no way you can be short euros.

Whereas if you think like in the end if macro is important it ends up swamping those things usually. So it’s difficult, you have to say okay I’m gonna say short euros into year end, but I’m fighting like this massive seasonality I’m kind of fighting positioning somewhat. So it’s quite tricky, I find. But then in the end, you know into year end people might just be panicking more and more about tariffs and just buying dollars in euros at 102 and so you don’t want to miss it so trying to determine how to weight the variables right now, I think in euros, really tough.

Alf (28:57.73)

Yeah, also this is one of the situations where you actually might be right in the sense that some of your variables that are negative for Europe actually do unfold. The problem is that there was so much priced in. So this is a situation where a small positive set of news for Europe can change the price quite rapidly on the other side of your trade.

So quite complicated. I just want to convey the fact that my client base, but not only that, I mean, there are a couple of very smart strategists at European banks that have gone to the US, for example, to talk to their client base and they report that the level of negativity on Europe is the same, they say, as 2011, 2012. When, if you remember, we were talking about whether Italy could refinance its debt. I mean, that’s what we’re talking about.

Brent (29:48.076)

Yeah, I call bullshit on that. I don’t think it’s anywhere close.

Alf (29:52.366)

Yeah, I agree, I agree. That’s a bit maybe sensationalistic.

Brent (29:55.822)

You know what it could be is that one of the more like mind melting setups is when everyone thinks that everyone thinks that everyone thinks everyone is bearish, you know, like, so no one wants to be short because everyone thinks everyone’s bearish, but then all of a sudden it’s like no one goes to that restaurant anymore because it’s too crowded. Like you don’t know what you’re supposed to do with it.

And I kind of feel like Europe might be a bit like that where, you know, going into the end of the year, people aren’t massively positioned generally like people tend to slow down a bit at the end of the year in a lot of funds and banks. So I feel like it might be one of those like everyone thinks that everyone thinks everyone’s short euros, but I guess we’ll see.

Alf (30:36.11)

Hey Brent, before we close the show, have you seen the Chinese Bazooka? No? No?

Brent (30:42.222)

No, we’re still looking for it. I was looking for it in 2020 and then 2021 and 2022 and 2023, but still looking for it. Actually, it’s funny because we were talking about that on the desk today because there’s some kind of policy thing happening next week in China. And there’s a guy that I work with who tends to be more on the China bull side. And he’s like, I’m surprised no one’s talking about this.

And I was like, dude, I don’t know. People have been hurt so many times by this. Look at a chart of BABA and how mental people went in September, October. It’s just like, people have been hurt by this so many times. But then, so everyone goes, OK, I’m not doing that again. And then as soon as the headline hits, everyone’s like, ba-bam, ba-bam, ba-bam, buying Chinese stocks and buying Aussies. So it’s tough.

Alf (31:34.626)

But I mean, David Tepper offloaded some very, very interesting bags on CNBC, I remember last time. But I mean, guys, I’m just making a joke. China will do what China does. The interesting thing about China is that they have such a different timeline, really. It’s not like there are elections in China where they need to wonder about what’s going to happen next time we go to the polls. It doesn’t really work that way.

Brent (32:06.04)

But you don’t think they care about US hedge fund performance?

Alf (32:09.454)

Yeah, yeah, absolutely they do. I mean, yeah, yeah, sure. So guys, very happy to be back. I hope you enjoyed the comeback show with Brent. I missed it when I was in Japan, but there are things you have to do to save a marriage and they do not include doing a podcast from Japan.

Brent (32:29.09)

All right, thanks everybody. Thanks for coming back, Alf. All right, see you next week, ciao.

Alf (32:31.896)

Talk soon, ciao.