The Macro Trading Floor transcript – 8 November 2024

Alf (00:01.006)

Hi everyone, welcome back to The Macro Trading Floor, Alf speaking with my good buddy Brent Donnelly. How are you doing Brent?

Brent (00:07.85)

Alfonso Peccatiello, I am pretty good. It’s still summer weather in New York City on November 7th. So here we go.

Alf (00:15.83)

I mean, please stop this. I’m in the Netherlands, man. I mean, don’t get me started. It’s November here. I’m going to see the sun next time in six months. What is this? Anyway, you know, today we’re recording, of course, before the Fed because we have this thing, you know, we always record before big events. So then we can make fools of ourselves looking back at the podcast and missing all the assumptions and all the forecasts we have.

But one thing is behind us, which is the US elections, I think we can safely say that we have a red wave. Funnily enough, this was a thing that I heard at a conference in Amsterdam by some US political experts, I think a month and a half ago, where they said, look, by looking at how the Senate reelection works and this and that, we think the red wave probability was underestimated.

I was like, where the hell do I look for a probability? How do I know where the market is pricing? And then you have all these probability websites, not that they’re very popular. Everybody’s talking about this thing. We can say we were early. Unfortunately, we were early and we made no money on being early, but that’s a different story. And now the wave is here and the market has reacted. But one thing I need to notice, Brent, before I ask you a question, 10-year treasuries, as we speak, are trading at 4.35%, which is exactly the same level they were trading just before the US election. So big sell-off, all retraced back. What the hell is going on?

Brent (01:39.512)

So I think this is a really interesting discussion because there’s so many assumptions going into the trade and into the election. And just a quick note on the, on the Polymarket and all that. Those people that are running those gambling sites are doing a victory lap and saying like we were correct, et cetera. I mean, gambling odds are just the aggregate of, the population. Sometimes they’re right. Sometimes they’re wrong. But anyways, they were right this time, just like the NFL spreads are right a lot of the time.

But I think the really interesting thing on the policy side is that people are just making all these assumptions based on obviously some, some fairly strong logic, like prior statements by the people involved and by what happened in 2016, 2017, 2018. But I think what we’re running into very quickly is that everyone was front running these assumptions, but we’re not going to have any information or evidence to sort of ratify or cancel out those assumptions for a long time.

So one, I mean, there’s so many topics we can talk about to tariffs, tax cuts, deficits, but one thing that should be on the horizon pretty early is the Treasury Secretary nomination. So usually Secretary of State and Treasury Secretary are nominated first. The last few Treasury Secretaries were announced or nominated on November 30^th of the election year.

So it seems to me and tell me if you disagree, it seems to come down to three main names. Scott Bessent, think is leading. He’s Key Square. Paulson has been in the news a lot very recently, although he wasn’t really in the news much before that as a possible Treasury Secretary. And then you always have to have Lighthizer in there, and Jamie Dimon has been in there for 25 years. I remember in the year 2000, he was a candidate for Treasury Secretary. So I don’t think Dimon’s involved. He’s actually pretty, I’m pretty sure he said he’s not. So it comes down to Bessent, Paulson or Lighthizer. Any thoughts on that, Alf?

Alf (03:47.822)

If I wish who was going to be the one. The only thing I can tell is that I recently listened to a podcast of Scott Bessent. So he was publicly out there. I think he still runs Key Square. Maybe I’m wrong, but he probably still runs it. He’s a macro investor. Then at least we get somebody who is supposedly in the weeds. He is in the weeds of markets. So you don’t get a bureaucrat if you get him, right? You should get somebody who is hands on markets.

And, you know, there has been so much speculation about what Yellen has engineered to avoid long end yields going higher. You know, this, this, I think at some point you asked me, whether I thought that the biggest macro driver in the U S as a data wasn’t a macro driver, but it was the quarterly refunding announcement. If you remember that, right? I mean, everybody, everybody at some point was calculating DVO one or duration adjusted supply to figure out all this.

I mean, let’s see what Trump wants to do, but one thing is for sure, that there are multiple aspects to Trump’s policies. And I think that people take at face value the most extreme parts of it. Let’s see how much he wants to be extreme versus what he announced. For instance, he announced he’s gonna cut corporate tax again to 15%. Wow. I mean, like, I’m not sure whether he’s gonna deliver that or is he gonna just keep 21 % when the 2025 rollover happens.

In general, I have the feeling, and I want to really ask you what you think about it, that there is quite a lot of extremism about these policies and quite a lot of assumptions that everything is going to be doing is going to increase deficit. It’s going to push up nominal growth, but there are nuances in his policies. I mean, the guy wants to cut the government spending. He doesn’t only talk about increasing deficit. He also talks about cutting government spending. So what should we do about that? And tariffs, is that like a blanket thing or should we be a bit more nuanced in assessing what that implies?

Brent (05:49.6)

Yeah, I think that’s the interesting thing too, is if you look at in his opening statement or his victory speech, one of the first things he actually said was, we’re going to reduce debt. Now, can you cut taxes and reduce debt? I mean, there’s a playbook that claims that tax cuts pay for themselves. The evidence shows that they don’t, but whatever. But I think they can be holding those two thoughts in their heads at the same time.

And if you’re looking at 2016, that’s one framework, but you can also look at what Javier Milei is doing in Argentina as another framework, which is he’s someone that is sympathetic. Trump is sympathetic to him. Musk is sympathetic to him. And there the focus is on cutting government waste, cutting government spending. And so you have to look at like what order is all this stuff going to get addressed.

So the tariffs was a big reason to sell bonds and buy dollars. But if you look at 2016, the strategy really was to like hold tariffs as a bargaining chip and keep threatening and threatening and threatening. And then they did these like fake trade deals that never worked out that apparently China reneged on the 150 page deal and all that. And then eventually the tariffs came, but they came in 2018. So to be buying dollars now ahead of tariffs that could be like in 2026 I think is a very challenging trade, obviously, and even today that’s played out. So I think that part of it is very difficult is the timing.

So going back to the treasury secretary, I think Bessent or Paulson are a little bit less scary for markets. They’re more like market friendly hedge fund manager kind of guys. And then Lighthizer sends a completely different signal, which is we’re going to 2016, we’re going hardcore, 60%, 10%, 20%, all these tariffs are gonna be in play much quicker with Lighthizer.

And then you can also factor in the Musk aspect where obviously he has Trump’s ear, he financed some part of the communication strategy for Trump’s victory. And when he was on Joe Rogan, he is talking down tariffs because as an auto manufacturer, tariffs are bad for your supply chain. So Musk’s message was essentially that you need to give a very long on-ramp for tariffs because they’re very difficult to manage on the supply chain side. I think it comes down a lot to personnel, but the idea of playing tariffs now, I don’t know, now that the dust has settled, like I think it made sense going in because that’s kind of like the baseline.

But then now that the dust has settled, there’s quite a few offsetting ways of looking at it. I mean, the reality is 2017 and 2018, the dollar actually went down a lot in those years. So yes, it rallied on Trump’s victory afterwards. But net-net, you actually didn’t want to be long dollars for a long time until essentially till the Fed got way more hawkish and the tariffs came. And that’s when dollar China and all those trades started working. So I think there’s a big timing problem on a lot of this.

And what it’s gonna come down to is being good at analyzing each breadcrumb as it gets dropped because the way that everything worked in 2016 to 2020 was that there’s all this stuff gets floated, gets tweeted, Wall Street Journal has the scoop, Financial Times has the scoop and half of it was bullshit and then half of it was real. So understanding what all the breadcrumbs mean and then being able to react to them, think will kind of be the key going through the next whatever it is, three months to inauguration or like six to 12 months as policy gets rolled out.

Alf (09:41.26)

Yeah. The other thing we should discuss is market pricing and market reaction. So to this, I’m going to refer to everyone who wants to listen to go and listen to Stan Druckenmiller podcast was released this week with a Nikolai Tangen. I think the podcast is called In Good Company. It’s the podcast from the Norges Bank that Nikolai Stangen is running.

So he interviews Druckenmiller and they’re asking him, you, short excerpt, they’re saying, you you think of macro and he says, you know, it’s a fiscal crisis, sell bonds. And I had a client saying, you know, man, every time I listened to Dalio and to Druckenmiller and there’s always this fiscal crisis, it never happens. I was like, okay, well, this is a topic we should discuss. So I don’t agree with Druckenmiller that there is going to be any fiscal crisis, but this doesn’t matter because I can be wrong. It can be right or vice versa.

The part of the podcast, which is the most interesting is where he says, most, the biggest mistake I see macro investors doing is that they invest in the present. Basically, if somebody comes to you now and says, you know, Trump won, you should sell the Mexican peso. Yeah, the Mexican peso has been going down pretty much in a straight line for like a couple of weeks already on the odds that Trump was going to win. And it has gone down as well the night after elections because Trump has won. So I’m not sure how much more there is to this.

I mean, effectively, the point is that you invest against a set of market expectations that are baked into prices. So it’s more about finding where the herd will move next, before the herd moves, actually, before the herd moves. And when somebody pitches you a Trump trade now, you should ask him, you sure it’s not priced already? I think it’s a valid question. And the podcast with Druckenmiller is always good to listen to. You also have some war stories about the sterling and the Thai bhat a peg broken, I mean, it’s amazing. Go listen to that.

Brent (11:40.522)

And one thing that related to what you just said is that very often you get this situation where something is announced and it’s going to happen at some point in the future, but the announcement effect is very strong. So the market tries to price the thing the second the announcement happens. But then you have like this baton pass problem between the announcement and the actual implementation of the policy. And in that sort of no man’s land, which could be where we are now, you get a very difficult time to own the position that was announced.

So for example, with the Mexican peso, it’s rallying a lot today as people are unwinding and reassessing. And ultimately, maybe it ends up being the right trade, right? If there’s a massive tariff on every Chinese export that comes through Mexico, that could end up being really bad for the peso. But entering at the night of the election has been painful because now you don’t really know what the timing is. And that kind of goes to what I was saying in terms of policy rollout.

And then, so speaking of deficits, I mean, I feel like this deficit story is just something that’s always going to be lurking. Like it was always there for Japan for 10, 15, 20 years. And then people just got bored of it. And then now with rates at zero, people just don’t care. And now it’s more like a focus in the UK and in the U S and it’s always going to be relevant, but I agree with you that it’s just never going to happen because the government has a lot of tools to push back.

But in terms of deficits, I think the initial forecast that was going around was that Trump will be seven trillion and Harris will be three and a half trillion. And that was kind of like the sort of common knowledge headline number. But then again, going to some of the statements like Trump saying we’re going to reduce debt. And the reason I think it’s not completely like people will say like, you can’t cut taxes and cut debt, and there’s not enough room in discretionary spending to actually reduce the government and all that. And I get all that.

But at the same time, I think one of the big lessons from this cycle, which is the same lesson as the 70s, but everyone always forgets all the lessons, is that politicians that create, that even if they don’t create it, but politicians that are in power during periods of inflation tend to get screwed over by the electorate. Inflation affects 100 % of people in the economy. Unemployment affects between 4 % and 10%, depending on the unemployment rate. So this inflation was a big reason, I think, and I mean, I’m not the only one that thinks that, that Democrats got smoked.

And I think this new administration is going to be cognizant of the fact that like full on MMT is inflationary. And you know, if you have Scott Bessent in there, he’s going to be thinking that way. And so maybe it’s not as much of a home run to assume massive MMT-like deficit expansion.

And like, sure it’s up for debate, but I’m just saying that I think the common knowledge going in is now already being questioned two days later. And ironically, that’s what happened in 2016, right? S &Ps were limit down. And then basically everything that everyone had as common knowledge flipped two days after the election. So in a way, we’re getting the same thing now.

Alf (15:04.14)

I mean, there are two comments I would like to make on this. First of all, I would like to remind people that Trump was also the president in 2017 and in 2019. And please check your charts and go tell me where 10 year treasuries were in 2017 and 2019. They weren’t three, 4%. They were 2%. So basically the macro environment tends to trump Trump. Well, pun intended, but tends to dwarf a bit the short term reaction to what the policies could be because, you know, rates react to a lot of things. And Trump can apply some policies, but single-handedly changing the entire micro environment. I mean, it’s not an easy thing to do, right?

So that’s one thing. And the other one is, so let’s take a step back. Okay. So you are Trump and your priorities can be multiple from foreign policies and geopolitics, stopping wars and whatever you want to do with Russia, Ukraine or the Israel conflict. And you can have an agenda there. When you look at the agenda domestically for the US economy, if you’re Trump, what would you do? Would you come in and do crazy stuff or would you basically act a little bit more on autopilot?

I mean, frankly, the US economy is doing pretty okay for the time being. Yeah, some risks are emerging for the labor market, but broadly speaking, it’s hard to say that the US economy isn’t doing great. You have a disinflationary process in place, you have GDP doing fine, you the labor market doing okay, issues not that bad. So from a pure risk management perspective, with rates at four and a half percent, if you end up doing something a bit stupid, a bit over the top, don’t you run more risks than benefits you can reap out of these policies?

So if you, for example, come up with something really aggressive on fiscal right now, where are you going to send the long end? Well, probably to 5 % or something above that. So what is that going to do to the housing market? What is that going to do to leverage? Are you running more risks than are you reaping benefits, I would say at this point? I think so.

So if I was Trump right now, would just probably take it a little bit slow. I mean, because he’s Trump, everybody expects him to volcanically erupt some tweets where he says that he’s going to do five trillion of deficits tomorrow. But I’m not sure that’s going to happen, Brent.

Brent (17:33.88)

You know, it’s interesting that just got me thinking and I hadn’t thought about this until you just mentioned that — is another difference in starting points is if you look at the position of China versus the US in 2016, 2017, Trump felt like he had something to do because he wanted to break, know, China was winning and you know, USA needed to win and we needed to get sick of how much winning we were doing because we were winning so much.

And now China’s not winning. So maybe there’s a little bit less urgency on the tariff side too. I hadn’t thought of that until just now, but I could see that too, is that if you just think of priorities and like what really jumps off the page, it’s not really that there’s a huge problem with China other than a big structural trade balance problem, which has existed since I was a kid. But in terms of like who’s winning the race right now, I mean, the US is clearly winning on most metrics.

So, again, that suggests maybe there won’t be as much urgency. And really, maybe the urgency will come in terms of cutting government bloat or cutting government spending — around the margins anyways, in the really obvious ways. Because that’s what people want. It’s a little bit anti inflationary. And it fits with the Musk.

If you look at Musk, he loves Javier Milei, Musk at Twitter cut 80 % of the workforce on day one. And that’s what Milei is doing as well. So, I mean, it’s perfectly reasonable to think that might be the priority. And tariffs are in the mix, obviously. And tax cuts definitely would probably be a priority ahead of tariffs too.

Alf (19:15.98)

Yeah. So now we are making a podcast here, trying to argue that Trump is positive for bonds. No, just, this might be a stretch, but we’re trying to always be thought provoking on this podcast rather than telling you what you can already see on the screen, trying to tell you what the herd might be thinking next. And therefore trying to anticipate a bit where consensus might move.

And I think Brent is into something here because also the other thing is that Trump doesn’t like high rates. That’s an historical thing. The guy defaulted a couple of times, went bankrupt, so he definitely doesn’t like paying high rates on his debt. And he always said, I remember in his previous presidency where he was complaining that the holders of treasuries were foreign investors. So why would you pay high coupons to these foreign investors? You’re making them rich to own your treasuries. I don’t know, some narrative he had there.

But the idea is, look, I think if I’m Trump, I don’t want to have rates at 6 % or 7%. What is that going to do to the housing market? What is that going to do to the US economy? At some point, these refinancings of turned out corporate debt and household debt, at some point they come in. If you have a four-year presidency, I’m not sure you’re really happy to keep rates that high. It’s more about making sure the economy does well, and it is doing well by itself.

At the end of the day, not saying that Trump is positive for bonds, but given the set of pricing, some questions must be asked, I think, from that perspective. The other one is on the dollar Brent, I think, where there is this dollar smile theory that you have. I quoted it in an article that I recently published to my subscribers as well. And, you know, there is a case to be made that we are in the part of the smile — so the smile is basically the two points where the dollar appreciates versus the center of the smile is where it depreciates. You know, the point of the smile of this smile is where it appreciates is either when things are really, really, really, really, really bad — and so the dollar is seen as a safe haven, a deleveraging currency, and then people go and buy that — or when the U S is overperforming other economies, right? And then you have this weak global growth and strong U S growth. And then the dollar appreciates.

And right now, I think the first reaction was that one, you know, there’s going to be tariffs. Other countries are going to be penalized. U S nominal growth is great, much better than it is in Europe or in Japan. So we’re going to go and buy dollars. But if Trump comes in and the tariffs are like, I don’t know, a damp squid or something. So is there not a chance where people might actually be negatively surprised by this tariff implementation? Because it’s Musk’s way, slow to be rolled out, and therefore actually the dollar is overcrowdedly long, as a positioning and can unwind?

Brent (22:03.724)

Well, I think that goes also to your point about the Druckenmiller thing is where are we today versus where are we going to be in the future? And obviously that’s the hard part. But you could say that, yes, the starting point is and the trade has been to buy dollars on US exceptionalism because Europe’s in the garbage dump and most other countries like Canada and New Zealand are not growing.

But then you can also make the argument that like economic surprises are ticking up in Europe, we’re coming from a super low base, China maybe at least has plugged the hole in the bathtub, even if they’re not refilling the bathtub. So you can make the argument that we could head back a little bit closer to the middle of the dollar smile.

I mean, it’s a tough one, but then actually just speaking of 2016, 17, 18. So that’s actually what happened in 17, 18 was you went into 16 with the US exceptionalism. China had devalued. US was becoming more independent on energy. Then 2017, 2018, kind of out of nowhere, Macron won in France. Then you had the most synchronized global growth basically in history, something like 30 out of the 32 biggest economies were growing for the first time since whatever. And the dollar sold off throughout all of 17 and 18 because of that because we were perfectly in the middle of the dollar smile.

So again, I think what we’re doing here is trying to present the alternative hypothesis to what’s obvious right now, right? Like every data point about Germany has been bad. It’s pretty obvious that US is exceptional and that’s kind of like where we are now. So the question is, can you suss out, is there a way forward where that’s not the case? And I mean, I think there is. I mean, I think coming off such a low base of low expectations for Europe and for China, sure. I mean, why not? I think that’s possible.

Alf (24:05.964)

Yeah, I mean, and again, this is going to sound really weird to a lot of people because we all know that European economies are facing challenges. I mean, we see what Germany is doing. We see Volkswagen closing plans for the first time ever in Germany. But again, the news has already hit the screen. This is something that should already be quite priced. So we’re always trying to find ways to understand where the herd might move next.

A more philosophical question here, Brent, is how do you make sure you are not stubbornly contrarian by definition while applying this game? Because look, it’s very simple. One can reduce this thing to a very extremist take, where it says, well, you want to know where the herd is going to be moving? It’s where the herd isn’t today. So I’m just going to go and say the opposite thing that everybody’s thinking. And that’s going to make me a great macro investor. How do you reply to this point actually?

Brent (25:02.23)

No, no, that’s a critical question because I used to get killed in my 20s and 30s doing this, doing what you’re describing, which is, everyone’s bullish so I’m just going to be short. But then what happens is in trends, people are just bullish for the whole trend and then they’re late to get out, but they make money all the way up. So you can’t just be reflexively contrarian.

I think the main way to get around that is so you look at this current setup, which is what are we today, which is what we’ve described which is US exceptionalism and bad Germany, let’s say, just very simplistically. Then you look for data points that support some kind of turn in the narrative that, for example, there’s going to be an election in Germany. Would that change things? Is the economic data turning? Is the ECB at a point where they feel like they’re getting close to neutral?

So I think you have to look at the second derivative and say, okay, my baseline here is that maybe people are over exuberant about the US and about the Trump trade, but I’m not just going to go short US for no reason. What I’m going to do is be open to evidence that suggests that this is not the right trade. That’s kind how I think about it. Essentially, what you’re doing is saying the current equilibrium is what it is, but it can be maintained for a long time, right? I mean, US exceptionalism has been a theme off and on since whatever, 2017.

So to me, I just look for evidence of, okay, like through positioning and through data and through new, whatever new information like elections and policy and central banks, is the new information supporting the trend or is it possibly pushing back against the trend? And then you have a lot of people short euros right now. So if we get some new evidence that doesn’t support that trade, then you could end up with an asymmetry where Euro ends up rallying simply because of unwinds on a tiny change in fundamentals.

Alf (27:03.372)

Yeah, that’s correct. So the last ingredient is exactly what you were starting to mention here. In the Druckenmiller podcast, there is a very clear episode where he says, well, in 2021, we had a look at the money supply or whatever he was looking at as a leading indicator of inflation. And we thought there was a chance that inflation could pick up. Then we looked at the market and two year rates were at like 15 basis points, 0.15%.

So he says, unless you assume the U.S. wants to go negative in interest rates, which we don’t think it’s going to do as a step, you can lose 15 basis points of basically carry and roll a year. That’s as much as you could lose, a tiny amount. And then how much you can make with people changing their mind, you can make a lot. So I mean, this is something that is a bound problem. You literally have a bound defined downside and you can have a very large upside.

And what Brent, what you were saying before is sometimes there are instruments that are not bound by definition. So FX for example, I mean, the Euro could be 0.8 versus the dollar for all we know, right? It’s not a bound issue. It’s not a bound problem. But if you can somehow quantitatively define that there are quite a lot of people that are long or it’s very hard to identify who could add to the existing position, basically the position is crowded, the key here is that it takes a small amount of contrasting information to make the existing crowded position suffer a lot.

So that’s another source of thinking about convexity. It’s not necessarily a bound problem, but it’s a small amount of information that can cause quite a lot of price action your way. That’s also important. Like if you try to envision, hey, what happens tomorrow on the screens if you hear “new German government cancels the black zero policy and wants to do 4 % deficits a year”?

Okay so imagine you have a headline like that. Okay. What’s going to happen to European rates? What’s going to happen to the Euro? If you try to foresee that, then you have a gut feeling of how positioning is today in that specific asset class and how a piece of information can change the entire picture and make the whole thing skewed. Did I make any sense?

Brent (29:21.176)

Yeah, no, that totally makes sense. And then another tool that you can use to drill down to is things like technicals and price action and positioning data so that you see like, okay, we’ve appeared to have reached an inflection point. You know, this thing just rallied on record volumes and then closed below yesterday’s close or whatever setups you like.

And then you can use those as further confirmation of like, okay, new information came today. This thing happened that I like as a technical setup. So now I’m going to go the other way. As opposed to just saying like, you know, Mag7 is a big part of the S&P. So I’m going to be short for the next three years.

One thing about that, the fixed income trade when yields were low is the big challenge with those trades is sometimes just the timing because you don’t lose money, but you don’t make money for so long. Like that’s what happened to a lot of people with the big short in 2008 was, you know, obviously they make a movie about the people that made all the money. But before that, there were people doing the trade from 06 to 07 who were early, just a little bit too early and were just basically flat. You know, you’re probably down 150 basis points over two years. But as stewards of capital, they’re getting fired because they’re not performing. And that is one of the hardest things sometimes with those slow burner trades is timing it. And that’s why I think like having technical signals can be useful.

Alf (30:49.422)

Yeah, I think you’re right on that too. So guys, in this podcast today, you have heard that Trump is positive for bonds and negative for the dollar. If in six months you figure out that that’s the case, you heard it here on The Macro Trading Floor. If not, well, we were just two stupid guys saying some stupid out of consensus thing and we were wrong as well.

Just kidding, but in general, it’s always good to try and foresee what might happen that the consensus is not expecting to happen rather than open Twitter and read some people telling you Trump won, you should sell bonds and you should sell the Mexican peso because that’s probably, I’m going to venture to say, already priced in.

Brent (31:33.022)

One last thing before we go is just speaking of — and just I hope that people understand that Alf’s slightly joking there. What we’re trying to do is present the alternative hypothesis. And there’s definitely one in gold too, because really I think what the evidence has shown since 2008 is that it’s been the release valve for huge deficits. So I think it’s really interesting that gold sold off on Trump.

Again, like, you can only assign so much information to two days of price action after a US election. But the fact that the weekly RSI was over 80, which is very rare if you look back, that’s like, doesn’t happen very often. And then you get the big deficits winner, apparently in the US election and gold drops 100 bucks. I think that’s very eye opening. So some of some of that could go to what you said, which is it’s just price for perfection and crowded. But we’ll see, maybe it’s an idea that people are reassessing the whole deficit thing.

Alf (32:34.36)

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, the podcast is going to be stopped for three weeks because here, here, I’m on holiday. From time to time, I also take time off, go to Japan, enjoy some sushi. And so you guys are going to miss us for three weeks, but we’re going to be back in early December. Try not to do consensus trades, please. Try to think in risk reward terms in the meantime, and we’ll be back at the beginning of December.

Brent (33:00.726)

All right. Thanks everybody. Thanks, Alf. Ciao.